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Abstract
Prevention has been a main issue of recent policy orientations in health care. This renews the
interest on how different organizational designs and the definition of payment schemes to providers
may affect the incentives to provide preventive health care.
We focus on the externality resulting from referral decisions from primary to acute care providers.
This makes our analysis complementary to most works in the literature allowing to address in a
more direct way the issue of preventive health care. The analysis is performed through a series
of examples combining different payment schemes at the primary care center and hospital. When
hospitals are reimbursed according to costs, prevention efforts are unlikely to occur. However,
under a capitation payment for the primary care center and prospective budget for the hospital,
prevention efforts increase when shifting from an independent to an integrated management. Also,
from a normative standpoint, optimal payment schemes are simpler under joint management.
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1 Introduction.
Prevention is one of the points of attention of the recent policy orientation in health
care to maintain the objectives of equity, efficiency, and quality in face of the in-
creasing budgetary difficulties to finance universal health care systems.
Despite its policy relevance, we do find a shortage of economic analysis of
how market interaction affects prevention. Moreover, there are several notions of
prevention. Kenkel (2000) distinguishes among primary, secondary and tertiary
prevention; The American Board of Preventive Medicine, as quoted by Dranove
(1998), proposes a global definition of preventive medicine; Oliver and Berger
(1979), quoting Kasl and Cobb (1996), provide an individualistic approach to pre-
ventive health care behavior; Boxx and Chambless (1975) adopt the perspective of
the firm.
Here, we are interested in the industrial organization of the health care mar-
ket and the role of prevention. According to Kenkel (2000, pp. 1684-1685) “The
field of health economics has not developed explicit models of the supply of pre-
vention. (...) A complete understanding of the supply of preventive medical care
would require analysis of the structure of the physician services markets and the
health insurance market, recognizing the multiple agency relationships between the
physician, consumer, and third party payer.”
Within this general framework, we address the effects of providing preventive
health services according to whether this provision is centralized or decentralized
among first and second level providers. The driving force behind these effects is
the externality imposed by the referral of patients from the primary care center to
the hospital. This is a new element not present in the previous literature.
Several previous contributions in the literature have looked at different aspects
related to our model. The payment rules vary according to the service and accord-
ing to the risk burden imposed upon the provider (see Mossialos and Le Grand
(1999) for a review of systems in place in the European Union countries). For
example, capitation payments defined for a narrow scope of services are usually
coupled with additional mechanisms to restrict unnecessary, burden-shift referrals.
This is very much in line with our results. In particular, the optimality of vertical
integration can be replicated by an appropriate transfer contract in a non-integrated
structure.
Barigozzi (2001) studies optimal reimbursement for secondary prevention and
treatment when insurance uses a linear mechanism and treatment and prevention
may be either substitute or complementary goods. In this regard the WHO (1998)
supports the idea of mixed payment systems, with a significant prospective compo-
nent. Nonetheless, there is the worry of prospective payments leading to excessive
referrals. We address the question explicitly in our model. Also, Fournier and
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McInnes (2002) study the role of referrals in the provision of quality of surgical
services according to patients holding a traditional insurance or being under man-
aged care.
Banks, Parker and Wendel (2001) examine the strategic interaction among
providers of acute care and of nursing facilities, and how payment systems in-
teract with incentives for vertical integration. They find that the transition from a
variable to a fixed payment hospital reimbursement system created incentives for
vertical integration and inefficient production. Though with a different aim, our
main questions are close to theirs.
Weiner and de Lissovoy (1993) show that different levels of provider integra-
tion originates distinct preventive levels. Pauly (1970) finds a positive relation
between financial means and prevention effort. Frank, Glazer and McGuire (2000)
relate the prevention effort with the attraction of healthier than average population.
To these arguments, we add the internalization of the referral decisions.
Our model shows that the referral externality induced by the referral of pa-
tients from the primary care center to the hospital constitutes an important element
in the provision of preventive health care services. In particular, it changes in un-
expected ways the assessment of likely effects of moving from independent to joint
management of different levels of health care providers. The analysis is performed
through a series of examples combining capitation vs fee-for-service at the primary
care center with prospective vs cost-based payment at the hospital. We find that the
referral externality has an impact on the prevention efforts exerted at the primary
care center according to the payment schemes and management organization. In
particular, we will argue that when hospitals are reimbursed according to costs,
prevention efforts are unlikely to occur. However, under a capitation payment for
the primary care center and prospective budget for the hospital, prevention efforts
increase when shifting from an independent to an integrated management. Also,
from a normative standpoint, we obtain that optimal payment schemes are simpler
under joint management. Thus, the referral externalities argument can be a poten-
tial explanation for the growth of both types of managed care vis-a-vis the decline
of traditional insurance agreements.1
The institutional setting of the model corresponds to a relatively centralized
health care system as is common in most EU countries. We assume a compulsory
health care insurance on the population provided publicly, privately (regulated) or
both. This makes demand price-insensitive at the point of consumption. Therefore,
a reduced form for demand is used. Our focus is on the supply side. Thus, in this
setting there is not much room for the players to integrate. Rather this is a decision
1The qualification “potential” is due to the absence of a formal empirical test of this effect, which
is beyond the scope of the paper.
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left to the Health authority according to some welfare analysis.
The paper is organized in the following way. Section 2 presents the model
and introduces the behavioral assumptions on the players. Section 3 is devoted to
the analysis of the equilibrium. We introduce two different types of management
(independent or joint) for the primary care center and the hospital and compare
the equilibrium effort levels. Our analysis of integration is limited. Most of the
literature on vertical integration considers more than two firms. Accordingly, there
is room for strategic effects such as dumping of patients among hospitals (see e.g.
Ellis and Ruhm (1988)). We abstract from these effects to stress the relevance of
the externality produced by the referral of patients from the primary care center
to the hospital. Section 4 illustrates the optimal (welfare maximizing) payment
schemes. Section 5 concludes.
2 The model.
Consider a population ofN individuals fully covered with a compulsory health in-
surance providing preventive care services and treatment services when necessary.2
Such services can be obtained from first or second level providers whose manage-
ments can be independent or joint. A healthy individual enjoys a utility level B.
Patients suffers a health loss L˜ = L + η, where L is a non-recoverable utility loss,
and η is a random term reflecting illness severity. Utility loss η can be recovered
by adequate treatment. We assume illness severity to be distributed according to a
probability distribution function F (η) with support [η, η], η > 0.
Implicitly we are considering a “minor” sickness in the sense that its treatment
does not require sophisticated technology and where the life of the patient is not at
stake. Nevertheless, these cases are important in economic terms as they involve a
very significant share of the working time lost. Examples of the type of sickness
we consider are stress, flu, depression, small accidents leading to broken arms or
legs, etc. We are not considering situations where diagnosis occurs at the hospital
although treatment can take place at either facility, such as some cancer treatments,
dialysis, etc. neither do we consider emergency services like stroke or failure of
vital organs.
At the primary care center two activities take place. First, the primary care
center puts effort e1 to promote prevention. We can think of this effort as pri-
mary prevention, that is, as activities population-oriented such as vaccination cam-
paigns and clinician-oriented such as the use of disposable injections. These ac-
tions have an impact on the probability of an individual falling sick, p(e1). We
assume this illness probability function to be decreasing and convex in effort, that
2The insurance decision is not under consideration in this paper.
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is, p′(e1) < 0, p
′′
(e1) > 0. The cost of such effort is represented by a convex
function φ1(e1) satisfying φ
′
1(e1) > 0, φ
′
1(0) = 0, φ
′′
1(e1) > 0. Second, once
a patient arrives at the primary care facility a first evaluation, with cost v, is per-
formed to assess η. We assume no error is made in this assessment. The primary
care center defines a rule of referral stating that all patients with η < ηˆ are treated
at the primary care center. The value ηˆ depends positively on the effort e2 made by
the primary care center, that is, ηˆ = ηˆ(e2), ηˆ′(e2) > 0, ηˆ′′(e2) < 0. The choice of
ηˆ is conceivably constrained by clinical protocols establishing that for low enough
severities, the primary care center has the obligation to treat the patient, while for
high enough severities, the patient must be referred to the hospital. The probability
of not referring a patient is then F (ηˆ(e2)).
Effort e2 can thus be interpreted also as the effort of the primary care center
to treat patients (secondary prevention). Also, e2 can be thought of as the effort
to “triage” patients.3 In a different fashion, it can also be understood as actions
to improve communication between hospital specialists and primary care center
general practitioners, as well as actual behavior of both GPs and specialists. A
good example is the use of telemedicine (Harrison, Clayton and Wallace 1996;
Mair and Whitten 2000), and the development of electronic networks involving
primary care (Willmot and Sullivan 2000). The cost of effort e2 is φ2(e2) assumed
convex whenever effort is positive: φ
′
2(e2) > 0, φ
′
2(0) = 0, φ
′′
2(e2) > 0.
Let c˜(η) be the cost of treating a patient with severity η at the primary care
center. We assume c˜′(η) > 0 and c˜′(η) > 0. Define c(e2) as the average cost of
treatment per patient treated in the primary care facility:
c(e2) =
∫ ηˆ(e2)
η
c˜(η)dF (η).
We have c′(e2) > 0 and c
′′
(e2) > 0. The first part follows directly from ηˆ being
an increasing function of effort and cost of treatment being increasing in patients’
severity. The second part assumes the direct effect of increasing expected cost due
to an increase in severity of patients treated at the primary care center to dominate
the (eventually) decreasing marginal effect of effort on ηˆ and the (possible) smaller
density of patients at high severity levels (which also slows down the rate of growth
of costs).4
We denote by W (e1, e2) the revenues to the primary care center, where W is
defined byW
(
Np(e1), c(e2),N,Np(e1)F (ηˆ(e2))
)
. That is, the payment function
is (potentially) defined over the number of people visiting the primary care center,
3We acknowledge an anonymous referee for this suggestion.
4This last assumption is not strictly necessary. The expected cost of treatment can be concave, as
long as it is not too concave. See below.
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Np(e1), the average cost of treatment in the primary care center, c(e2), the pop-
ulation covered, N , and the number of people treated at the primary care center,
Np(e1)F (ηˆ(e2)). For simplicity, we use the reduced formW (e1, e2). We assume
W to be concave, W1(e1, ·) < 0, W2(e2, ·) > 0, Wii(ei, ·) < 0, i = 1, 2.. Fur-
thermore, it is decreasing in e1 as the more effort to promote prevention leads to
less activity and thus, to less revenue. Also, we assume it increasing in e2 as the
less referring of patients involves more activity at the primary care center.
The hospital only action consists in doing some effort to lower treatment costs.
Let e3 denote such effort, and φ3(e3) its convex cost.5 Note that this is a differ-
ent type of activity. In particular, the hospital does not take preventive activities.
Rather, it only seeks ways to become more efficient from a technological point
of view. Thus the cost of providing treatment at the hospital is directly linked
to this effort. The cost of treating a patient at the hospital is h˜(ηˆ(e2), e3), with
h˜2(ηˆ(e2), e3) < 0 and h˜22(ηˆ(e2), e3) > 0. The expected cost is given by
h(e2, e3) =
∫ η
ηˆ(e2)
h˜(η, e3)f(η)dη,
satisfying h1(e2, e3) < 0, h11(e2, e3) < 0.6
The revenues to the hospital are denoted byR(e1, e2, e3), whereR(e1, e2, e3) =
R
(
h(e2, e3), Np(e1)(1 − F (ηˆ(e2))
)
. That is, the payment schedule to the hospi-
tal depends on the (average) cost per patient and on the total number of patients
treated within the hospital. We assume R to be concave. Moreover it is decreasing
in all its arguments: the more effort to lower treatment costs, the less revenue is
required; the higher the primary care center efforts e1 and e2 the less activity at the
hospital level: Ri(ei, ·) < 0, Rii(ei, ·) < 0, i = 1, 2, 3.
We assume v < c(e2) < h(e2, e3). This is in accordance with conventional
wisdom. In other words, we assume that the infrastructure at the hospital is more
expensive than at the primary care center. Also, more qualified medical staff is to
be found at the hospital, also adding to the (average) cost.
We perform our analysis through a series of examples combining different pay-
ment rules both at the primary care center and at the hospital. In particular we will
consider an (extended) capitation scheme or a fee-for-service at the level of the
5One can discuss about the contribution of the hospital to improve referral patterns. In particular,
it is sometimes argued that hospitals have a relatively minor role in influencing referral rates from
primary care centers. We stylize this role by neglecting it. We can include another effort on the part
of the hospital consisting in actions to avoid referrals from the primary care center. These actions
would complement those embedded in e2 but would not add any particular insight to the analysis.
6Again, we assume the direct effect on cost to be stronger than the density effect and the (eventu-
ally) decreasing marginal effect of effort on ηˆ.
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primary care center to be combined with a prospective budget or a cost reimburse-
ment rule for the hospital. In these different set-ups we will study the impact on
the different efforts of a centralized or independent management of first and second
level providers. To do so, first we will define the objective functions of the players.
Also, we will introduce the a health authority (social planner) to be able, later, to
examine the optimality properties of the reimbursement schemes.
We can certainly discuss extensively the appropriate objective functions for
primary care centers and hospitals. We take here the (narrow) view that they want
to generate the higher possible surplus. We do not specify which use is given to
such surplus.7
The primary care center chooses effort levels e1 and e2 to maximize its net
revenues, that is,
ΠP = max
e1,e2
W (e1, e2)− φ1(e1)− φ2(e2)−Np(e1)[c(e2) + v]. (1)
The problem of the hospital is to select effort level e3 to maximize its net revenues.
Formally,
ΠH = max
e3
R(e1, e2, e3)− φ3(e3)−Np(e1)h(e2, e3). (2)
In the normative analysis, the benchmark is provided by the choice of the health
authority. It chooses effort levels e1, e2, e3 to maximize social welfare:
max
e1,e2,e3
V = BN −Np(e1)[L + c(e2) + v + h(e2, e3)]−
− [φ1(e1) + φ2(e2) + φ3(e3)]. (3)
3 Equilibrium Analysis
We aim at comparing the net revenue-maximizing efforts of the primary care center
and the hospital under two different management regimes, namely a decentralized
(independent) management and a centralized (joint) management. To do it, we
propose a series of examples defined by particular combinations of reimbursement
schemes.
7There is no change in the analysis if providers care only about recoverable utility loss due to
sickness, as patients are assumed to fully recover η after treatment.
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3.1 Independent management of primary care center and hospital.
Primary care center. From (1) we derive the first-order conditions. They are,
∂ΠP
∂e1
=W1(e1, ·)−Np
′(e1)[c(e2) + v]− φ
′
1(e1) = 0, (4)
∂ΠP
∂e2
=W2(·, e2)−Np(e1)c
′
(e2)− φ
′
2(e2) = 0. (5)
As usual, these conditions equate the marginal cost of the respective efforts to
the marginal revenues of the primary care center.
Hospital. From (2) the first-order condition is,
∂ΠH
∂e3
= R3(e3, ·)−Np(e1)h2(·, e3)− φ
′
3(e3) = 0. (6)
As usual, this condition equates the marginal cost of the effort to the marginal
revenue of the hospital.8
3.2 Joint management of primary care center and hospital.
Under joint management of the primary care center and the hospital, the selection
of efforts are derived from the following objective function,
Π = max
e1,e2,e3
W (e1, e2) + R(e1, e2, e3)
−Np(e1)[c(e2) + v + h(e2, e3)]− [φ1(e1) + φ2(e2) + φ3(e3)]
Accordingly, the system of first-order conditions is,
W1(e1, ·) + R1(e1, ·) −Np
′(e1)[c(e2) + v + h(e2, e3)]− φ
′
1(e1) = 0, (7)
W2(e2, ·) + R2(e2, ·) −Np(e1)[c
′(e2) + h1(e2, ·)] − φ
′
2(e2) = 0, (8)
R3(e3, ·)−Np(e1)h2(·, e3)− φ
′
3(e3) = 0. (9)
3.3 Social Welfare.
The problem to solve from the social welfare point of view is to find a vector of
efforts to maximize the function given by (3).
8Hereafter, we assume second-order conditions of all maximization problems to be satisfied. This
is equivalent to assume effort costs to be sufficiently convex.
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The set of first-order conditions is,
−Np′(e1)[c(e2) + v + h(e2, e3) + L]− φ
′
1(e1) = 0, (10)
−Np(e1)[c
′(e2) + h1(e2, ·)] − φ
′
2(e2) = 0, (11)
−Np(e1)h2(·, e3)− φ
′
3(e3) = 0. (12)
3.4 Joint management, independent management and welfare.
Let β and γ be parameters to allow the comparison of the joint and independent
management for the different efforts. Let also α and δ be parameters allowing this
comparison w.r.t. social welfare.
Looking now at the first-order conditions (4), (7), (10) we can summarize them
as,
φ
′
1(e1) = αW1(e1, ·) + βR1(e1, ·)
−Np′(e1)[c(e2) + v + γh(e2, e3) + δL]. (13)
Note that for α = 1 and β = γ = δ = 0 we recover (4); for δ = 0 and
α = β = γ = 1 we recover (7). Also for γ = δ = 1 and α = β = 0 we recover
(10).
Regarding effort e2, the first order conditions (5), (8) and (11) can be summa-
rized as,
φ
′
2(e2) = αW2(·, e2) + βR2(e2, ·) −Np(e1)[c
′(e2) + γh1(e2, ·)]. (14)
For α = 1 and β = γ = 0 we recover (5); for α = β = γ = 1 we recover (8).
Finally, for γ = 1 and α = β = 0 we obtain (11).
The first-order conditions with respect effort e3 in the independent and joint
management cases coincide. Therefore, we can summarize all the first order con-
ditions as,
φ
′
3(e3) = αR3(e3, ·)−Np(e1)h2(·, e3), (15)
where α = 1 lets us recover (6) and (9), while for α = 0 we recover (12).
To ease the comparisons between the different scenarios we summarize in Ta-
ble 1 the values of the transition parameters.
3.5 Joint vs. Independent Management
We can now address the following positive question: what is the effect of mov-
ing from a decentralized organization of primary and acute care to an integrated-
services view, conditional on the proposed payment rules?
8
Topics in Economic Analysis & Policy , Vol. 3 [2003], Iss. 1, Art. 10
Brought to you by | Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona
Authenticated
Download Date | 4/30/15 10:46 AM
Joint Independent Social Welfare
α 1 1 0
β 1 0 0
γ 1 0 1
δ 0 0 1
Table 1: Values of the transition parameters.
We know, from our normative analysis, that under the assumptions of the
model, the first-best can be achieved under both structures, provided payment
schedules are appropriately defined. Since the optimal rules derived (see section 4
below) are not observed in practice (up to our knowledge), then it is relevant to ask
what are the effort implications of alternative architectures for the health system.
To compare the joint management and the independent management, note that
looking at the two first columns of Table 1, α = 1 and δ = 0. Finally, β = γ
go from 1 to 0 when considering the transition from a joint to an independent
management. Hence, we can set β = γ and do the comparative statics on β.
The system of first-order conditions (13)-(15) characterizes the equilibrium ef-
fort levels. Generically, these first-order confitions can be summarized as
φ
′
i(ei) = k
i(β), i = 1, 2, 3,
where ki stands for the difference between marginal revenue and marginal cost
associated to effort ei.
To provide a positive view on the implication of our model, we have to define
a specific payment schedule. Thus, assume the hospital is reimbursed according
to a global budget rule set in a prospective manner, that is, R(e1, e2, e3) ≡ a0.
According to Mossialos and Le Grand (1999) global budget is the most common
type of payment of hospital care (even if the global budget is built on the basis of
expected activity).9
3.5.1 Capitation payment for primary care service
Regarding the primary care center, let us assume that it is reimbursed on an ex-
tended capitation basis, that is
W (e1, e2) = b1N + b2Np(e1) + b3Np(e1)F (ηˆ(e2)), (16)
9See Mossialos and Le Grand (1999) tables 1.4 and 1.5 for an overview of different systems
present in the European Union. This formulation has also been used extensively in the literature.
See, for example, Chalkley and Malcomson (2000).
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where b2 < v and b3 < c˜(ηˆ(e2)). Parameters b2 and b3 capture per capita value
per visit and per treatment respectively. We assume here that these values are be-
low their associated costs. The pure capitation system with no relation to actual
activity performed would pay only on the basis of population covered. This corre-
sponds to the first term (b1N ). We allow for partial payment on the basis of visits
(b2Np(e1)) and treatments (b3Np(e1)F (ηˆ(e2))). To still describe some form of
capitation payment, these two last payments cannot be sufficient to sustain activity
in an economically viable way as the marginal costs overcome the corresponding
marginal revenues for every patient. The case b3 > c˜(ηˆ(e2)) and b2 > v will be
treated below as they take us to fee-for-service schemes.
Now the system of first-order conditions, taking into account (16), reduces to
k1(β) ≡−Np′(e1)
[
c(e2)− b3F (ηˆ(e2))) + v − b2 + βh(e2, e3)
]
, (17)
k2(β) ≡−Np(e1)
[
c′(e2)− b3f(ηˆ(e2))ηˆ
′(e2) + βh1(e2, ·)
]
, (18)
k3(β) ≡−Np(e1)h2(·, e3)) ≥ 0, (19)
where c′(e2) = c˜(ηˆ)f(ηˆ)ηˆ′(e2), and h1(e2, ·) = −f(ηˆ)ηˆ′(e2)h˜(ηˆ(e2), e3).
As a first step, note that k1(β = 0) < k1(β = 1) for all e2 and e3; k2(β =
0) < k2(β = 1) for all e1 and e3; and k3(β = 0) = k3(β = 1) for all e1 and e2.
Thus, when changing from β = 0 to β = 1, the curve ki(β = 0), evaluated at the
new effort levels, is a lower bound to the true ki(β = 1), also evaluated at the new
equilibrium effort levels.
To have an interior equilibrium, at all effort levels, from the first-order condi-
tions (17) - (19), it is required that
c(e2)− b3F (ηˆ(e2)) + v − b2 + βh(e2, e3) > 0, (20)
(c˜(ηˆ(e2))− b3)− βh(e3, ηˆ(e2)) < 0. (21)
Expression (21) does not hold for β = 0 and it is likely to hold for β = 1.
Thus, for β = 0 effort e2 will be at its minimum value. The other expression is
satisfied for all values of β as long as b2 < c. This is a sufficient condition relating
the marginal cost of a visit in the primary care center with its marginal revenue. At
the margin the payment received associated with a consultation must be lower than
its cost.
Holding constant e3, it is easy to check that changing to an integrated-services
model will increase both e1 and e2. Figure 1 illustrates this argument.
Let us now study how ki(β) shifts when we allow for all efforts to vary.
10
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Figure 1: Impact of integration on e1 and e2.
Straightforward derivations establish that
∂k1
∂e2
= −Np′(e1)ηˆ
′f(ηˆ)[c˜(ηˆ)− b3 − βh˜(ηˆ(e2), e3)] =
∂k2
∂e1
∂k1
∂e3
= −Np′(e1)βh2(e2, e3) < 0
∂k2
∂e3
= Np(e1)βf(ηˆ)ηˆh˜2(ηˆ(e2), e3) ≤ 0
∂k3
∂e1
= −Np′(e1)h2(e2, e3) ≤ 0
∂k3
∂e2
= Np(e1)h˜1(ηˆ(e2), e3)f(ηˆ)ηˆ
′
≤ 0
From (21), we find that ∂k1/∂e2 = ∂k2/∂e1 is negative for β = 1 and positive
for β = 0.
Therefore, in equilibrium, both e1 and e2 increase with the move from indepen-
dent management to integrated services. It is also the case that e3 decreases. The
intuition runs as follows. With integration, decisions on the effort levels of preven-
tion and of treating patients in primary care take into account the costs of hospital
treatment if a patient reaches that stage. Thus, prevention efforts increase as well
as the effort to treat patients. This, in turn, reduces the incentive to invest in cost
reduction at the hospital level (as less patients reach the hospital). Since a lower
effort for cost reduction leads to higher unit hospital costs, it reinforces the incen-
tive to have higher efforts at the primary care level, ensuring internal consistency
of the comparative statics exercise. Figure 2 illustrates this discussion.
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Figure 2: Efforts under prospective payment for hospitals and capitation for pri-
mary care centers.
We summarize this discussion, in the following result:
Under a prospective payment rule for hospital care and capitation for primary
care services, in equilibrium both e1 and e2 efforts increase and e3 decreases when
moving from independent management to integrated services.
In other words, the change in the management structure of the two providers
of preventive health care services induces an increased effort to diminish the pop-
ulation of patients and also as many of those patients as possible are treated at the
primary care center. Consistently with this induced behavior on the part of the
primary care center, the hospital faces a lower incentive to control its treatment
costs.
3.5.2 Fee-for-service payment for primary care service
Consider again the payment schedule for the primary care center given by (16).
For treatments paid under fee-for-service, one would expect that marginal benefit
to the provider must exceed its marginal cost as all payments are linked to activity.
Thus, b3 > c˜(ηˆ(e2)) and b1 = 0. As in the previous case, k1(0) < k1(1) and
k2(0) < k2(1). Accordingly, when changing from β = 0 to β = 1, the curve
ki(0), evaluated at the new effort levels, is a lower bound to the true ki(1).
To have interior solutions, we need as before k1(β) > 0 and k2(β) < 0. Now,
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the latter expression always holds while the former will generally not hold for
β = 0 and effort e1 will be at its minimum, and may hold for β = 1.
Now when we consider a simultaneous variation of e1 and e2 we find that,
k1/e2 = k
2/e1 < 0 for all values of β.
Given the properties of this case, it is not possible to predict the final outcome
of the change to integrated services. In a first moment, both e1 and e2 increase.
This triggers a decrease in e3, but also a decrease in e2 and a further increase in e1.
However, due to cross-effects, there are conflicting forces affecting effort levels. In
particular, given that b3 > c˜(ηˆ(e2)), there is always advantage to the primary care
center in treating the patient. If integration increases the prevention effort, it also
means that the net benefit from treating people at the primary care level will be
smaller, as there is a smaller probability that someone will need treatment. Thus,
incentives to increase the probability of treatment in primary care are smaller. All
in all, the composite effect is ambiguous, a` priori.
This means that integration in health systems that pay primary care providers
on a fee-for-service basis may lead to quite distinct, and to a certain extent unex-
pected, outcomes.
3.6 Hospitals under cost reimbursement
Consider now the other limiting case, that is, full cost reimbursement where
R(e1, e2, e3) = Np(e1)h(e2, e3). It is straightforward to see that there is no incen-
tive to perform hospital cost-reduction effort (a well-known result).10 In addition,
whether we have fee-for-service in primary care (b3 > c˜(ηˆ(e2)) and b2 < v) or a
(partial) capitation system (b3 < c˜(ηˆ(e2))) is again crucial.
Under a capitation payment system to primary care, even if it is a partial one,
no effort to reduce referral rates is done by the primary care center. Prevention
effort, if done at all, is insensitive to the organizational design. This is so because
under a partial capitation, it is always profitable to the primary care center to divert
patients to the hospital. To see this, substitute the expression for W (e1, e2) in (1)
to obtain
ΠP = b1N + b2Np(e1)− vNp(e1) + b3Np(e1)F (ηˆ(e2))−Np(e1)c(e2)
− φ1(e1)− φ2(e2).
Take the first-order derivative associated with the effort decision,
∂ΠP
∂e2
= Np(e1)
[
b3f(ηˆ)ηˆ
′(e2)− f(ηˆ)ηˆ
′(e2)c˜(ηˆ(e2))
]
− φ
′
2(e2).
10To see this, take the profit of the hospital, given by expression (2) and substitute R(e1, e2, e3).
Then, ΠH = −θ3(e3), which yields minimum effort.
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Clearly, for b3 < c˜(ηˆ(e2)), which we identify with the capitation system,
∂ΠP
∂e2
< 0
yielding zero effort. Taking now the first-order derivative in prevention effort,
∂ΠP
∂e1
= Np′(e1)
[
(b2 − v) +
∫ ηˆ
η
(b3 − c˜(η))f(η)dη
]
− φ′(e1) < 0.
From which we obtain zero prevention effort.
Consider in turn the fee-for-service system, b3 > c˜(ηˆ(e2)) and v > b2. Under
this condition, v − b2 must be sufficiently high for prevention effort to be done at
positive levels. Whenever prevention effort is above its minimum level, integration
increases prevention and decreases the incentive for referral rate reductions. Again,
the full-cost reimbursement effect is at work. There is no cost in shifting patients
to the hospital. There is only the financial loss of not treating them at the primary
care center.11Again we should expect an increase in the overall cost of the system.
The last subcase occurs when prevention is not sufficiently rewarded, and e1
is set at its minimum value.12 Under fee-for-service, integration leads the hospital
management to recognize the financial gain associated with treating patients at the
primary care level. Thus, the effort to avoid referral to the hospital will increase.
We find again that optimal efforts will evolve in different directions, after inte-
gration of primary care and hospital management, depending on the way treatment
at primary care centers is paid. Regarding referral rates, they are also contingent
on the scenario considered. Table 2 summarizes all effects.
Hospital/PCC Capitation Fee-for-service
Prevention level increases Prevention level ambiguous
Global Budget Referral rate decreases Referral rate ambiguous
Hosp. average cost decreases Hosp. average cost ambiguous
Prevention level unchanged Prev. level unchanged or increasing
Cost-Based Referral rate constant Referral rate decreases
No hosp. average cost effect No hosp. average cost effect
Table 2: Effects due to a switch from independent to integrated management.
11This can be verified analytically by total differentiation of first-order conditions and computation
of comparative statics effects. To sign expressions, one appeals to second-order sufficient conditions:
principal minors alternate in sign, starting negative, for a maximum value of the objective function
to be achieved.
12This corresponds to expression (17) for v − b2 negative or small enough.
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3.7 Absence of prevention effort
Our analysis illustrates that vertical integration of different layers of provision in
the health care market and prevention issues cannot be seen in isolation. The eco-
nomic incentives are interdependent in a non-obvious way. To make the point clear,
suppose that prevention effort done by the primary care center is constant.13 Then,
k2(β) =−Np(e¯1)f(ηˆ)ηˆ
′(e2)
[
c˜(ηˆ)− b3 − βh˜(ηˆ(e2), e3)
]
k3(β) =−Np(e¯1)h2(e2, e3) ≥ 0
Totally differentiating the relevant first-order conditions with respect to e2, e3 and
β allows to establish that:
de2
dβ
> 0 and
de3
dβ
< 0 (22)
Thus, in the absence of prevention, the move from independent to joint manage-
ment leads to an increase in efforts to avoid referrals (consequently, the primary
care center treats more patients) and a decrease in hospital cost-reduction effort (as
fewer patients reach the hospital and higher hospital costs reinforce the incentive
to treat at primary care whenever feasible).
When prevention effort (and incentives) is accounted for and treatments at pri-
mary care are paid, at the margin, below cost, the same intuition and effects carry
through. However, if treatment at primary care is paid under fee for service, with
“price” above marginal cost (b3 > c˜(ηˆ(e2))), then comparative statics differ from
the case without prevention. This is so because prevention efforts change both the
marginal benefit of effort to avoid referrals to the hospital and the marginal ben-
efit of hospital cost reductions (decreasing on prevention effort). Any increase in
prevention dampens the incentive to do effort at the primary care center to avoid
referral to hospital, as described above. Thus, incentives for cost reduction, for
prevention and payments systems/providers organization interact in complex ways.
They cannot be treated in a simple additive way.
4 Implementing the first-best allocation of efforts
Given that our model assumes perfect information, the solution of the social wel-
fare problem must yield the first-best allocation of efforts. Thus, we can study the
design of the reimbursement schemes for the primary care center and the hospi-
tal allowing for the achievement of the first-best allocation of efforts both under
13The same argument can be done making any of the efforts constant in turn.
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joint and independent management. We can do this exercise without explicitly
computing the first-best effort levels simply by comparing the system of first-order
conditions (13) to (15) after applying the corresponding values of the transition pa-
rameters given in Table 1. The aim of the exercise is not to show that under either
regime there is always a reimbursement scheme allowing to achieve the first-best
allocation of efforts, but rather to illustrate the properties that such schemes should
have, so that the private marginal benefit of prevention equates the social one. For
that purpose we assume that the health authority chooses effort levels (e1, e2, e3)
to maximize a social welfare function given by expression (3).
4.1 Independent management
In terms of efforts e1 and e2 we can implement the first-best efforts if we can design
a reimbursement W (e1, e2) for the primary care center such that
W1 =−Np
′(e1)h(e2, e3), (23)
W2 =−Np(e1)h1(e2, e3). (24)
The reimbursement condition (23) establishes that, on the margin, the system
should reward on the basis of people treated and on the social value of preven-
tion, while condition (24) sets up a reimbursement component associated with the
marginal costs resulting from referral to the hospital. At the margin, the last term
equals the change in the savings from avoiding hospital treatment. That is, the ref-
erence benchmark is not the the cost of treating people in the primary care center
but the cost saving of avoiding their treatment in the hospital (the true economic
opportunity cost of primary care treatment). Regarding the hospital, effort e3 is set
at its optimal level.
4.2 Joint management
In the case of joint management, we can implement the first-best efforts if we can
design reimbursements W (e1, e2) and R(·, e3) for the primary care center and the
hospital respectively such that,
W1 + R1 =−Np
′(e1)L,
W2 + R2 =0,
R3 =0.
Under joint management, there is internalization of efforts affecting referral
rates, allowing for a global budget of the hospital part. As to the primary care
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center, the payment system only needs to correct for the marginal social value of
prevention.
Under adequate mixed payment rules, the first-best allocation of resources is
achieved under both system architectures. This is not surprising given the full
information context of the model. Note that under the absence of a non-recoverable
health loss (L = 0), a fixed budget scheme would be optimal.
5 Conclusions
We propose a model to examine the effects of providing preventive health care ser-
vices introducing a new effect linked to the externality generated by the referral of
patients from the primary care center to the hospital. A series of examples where
different payment schemes for the primary and acute care facility are combined
illustrates the main points. In particular, we consider capitation vs fee-for-service
at the primary care center with prospective vs cost-based payment at the hospital,
under centralized or decentralized management of the provision of health care. We
find that the referral externality has an impact on the prevention efforts exerted at
the primary care center according to the payment schemes and management orga-
nization. In particular, we argued that when hospitals are reimbursed according
to costs, prevention efforts are unlikely to occur and the overall costs of the sys-
tem tend to increase. However, under a capitation payment for the primary care
center and prospective budget for the hospital, prevention efforts increase when
shifting from an independent to an integrated management. Also, from a norma-
tive standpoint, we obtain that optimal payment schemes are simpler under joint
management.
This last point constitutes an argument for joint management, as it is being at-
tempted in the Portuguese NHS, with the creation of the ”local health systems”.
However, the full capitation payment envisaged for such health entities is not opti-
mal, according to our analysis. The reason is that a fully capitation payment for the
joint management still entails too few incentives for prevention efforts. Thus, the
payment rule must be such that the private marginal benefit of prevention equals
the social one.
Of course, under the independent management architecture, the payment rule
must also align the incentives for efforts that decrease referral rates. These ad-
justments are somewhat involved, as different referral rates also lead to different
efforts for prevention (by the primary care center) and cost reduction (by the hos-
pital). Still, in either case, the variables to be included in the payment rules are in
general observed, or can be presumably estimated from existing data (this is the
case of referral rates behavior and of the probability of being sick).
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In this paper we have identified a different motive to set a mixed reimburse-
ment system, which has a simple interpretation in our context. Moreover, unlike
other motives, the calibration of the weight parameters is prone to be measured.
This is in sharp contrast to other motives presented in the economics literature:
(i) the asymmetric information motive (Laffont and Tirole (1993)) requires knowl-
edge of the managers utility function for effort; (ii) the unobserved heterogeneity
motive (Pope (1990)) demands information on patient factors that drive health care
costs; (iii) the agency motive (Ellis andMcGuire (1986)) requires knowledge of the
physicians utility function; (iv) the measurement error motive (Newhouse (1991))
needs information on error variance of the prices.
The driving force behind our results is the referral externality. This makes our
analysis complementary to most works reported in the literature. It also addresses
in a more direct way the issue of preventive health care.
Our analysis is based on a very simple model that abstracts from many other
issues. Thus, for a complete view of actual payment systems and for a more
complete discussion of organizational design (integrated services vs. independent
providers), one must add other relevant aspects, treated in the literature. We con-
jecture, nonetheless, that the externality effect highlighted here will remain. More-
over, the type of payment system required to internalize the referral externality is
likely to survive in more complex settings.
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